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Voluntary participation is a long-standing tenet of environmental con-
flict resolution, prescribed at a time when the eventual reach and char-
acter of ECR could only be imagined. Today, ECR processes are
ubiquitous, varied, and not always voluntary. Voluntary engagement
involves choice and perception of fairness instilling commitment, good
faith, respectful exchange, and legitimacy. These essential process qual-
ities can be compromised if participation is mandated, yet mandates
are sometimes necessary. This disconnect between theory and practice
has been extensively examined for court-connected ADR involving civil
disputes, but not for ECR involving public disputes. Mediator experi-
ence with mandated ECR processes warrants attention.
Voluntary participation is a long-standing tenet of the environmentalconflict resolution (ECR) field, prescribed at a time when the eventual
reach and character of ECR could only be imagined. Today, ECR processes
are ubiquitous, varied, and not always voluntary. However, the voluntary
tenet has never been revisited; nor have the implications for practice been
explicitly examined for those processes in which parties do not engage vol-
untarily. This article attempts to unravel the logic implicit in the long-
standing prescription that collaborative ECR processes be voluntary. It asks
which qualities associated with a voluntary process have made it a central
tenet of ECR theory and what the shortcomings are when a process is com-
pelled or mandated instead. In other words, what might be lost if volun-
tary engagement is compromised? Finally, it assesses the implications for
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process dynamics and management when participation is not fully volun-
tary and concludes with a proposition for a revised perspective on the vol-
untary tenet.
ECR: From Theory and Concept to Embedded Practice
Thirty years ago, examples of multiparty collaboration involving environ-
mental issues were few and far between. Today, ECR processes are wide-
spread and encompass varied forms and applications. As Dukes (2004)
describes it:
The vocabulary that at one point favored mediation has expanded to
include terms such as consensus building, collaboration, collaborative
learning, collaborative planning, collaborative natural resource manage-
ment, community-based collaboration, and community-based conserva-
tion. Many practitioners would include enhanced public involvement
within their practice as well [pp. 191–192; italics in original].
Although collaboration that is focused on environmental problems has
become commonplace, ECR processes are nonetheless not uniform in ori-
gin, structure, or even purpose (Margerum, 2008). Some processes are
agency-initiated while others emerge organically from within communities
of place or interest (Koontz and others, 2004; Weber, 2003; Wondolleck
and Yaffee, 2000). Some are triggered by conflict while others arise from
shared concern about a place or recognition of a common problem
(Bernard and Young, 1996; Brick and Snow, 2000). Some encompass
many interrelated issues and have a long time horizon; others focus on a
few issues to be resolved in a limited time frame (Agranoff, 2007; Heikkila
and Gerlak, 2005; Lurie, 2004). Some are upstream, policy development
processes while others are downstream, focused on programs and site-
specific disputes (O’Leary and Bingham, 2003; Sabatier and others, 2005).
Some enlist the assistance of professional third parties, while others do not
benefit from formal intervention (Dukes, 2004). Regardless of their origin,
focus, and time frame, all exhibit the core characteristics that define ECR:
“direct, face-to-face discussions; deliberation intended to enhance partici-
pants’ mutual education and understanding; inclusion of multiple sectors
representing diverse and often conflicting perspectives; openness and flexi-
bility of process; and consensus or some variation other than unilateral
decision making as the basis for agreements” (Dukes, 2004, p. 191).
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Unlike ADR in civil cases connected to the courts that involve a lim-
ited number of parties, discrete issues, and short time periods in private
processes (Hedeen, 2005; Wissler, 2002), ECR processes involve many
parties over an extended time period, often dealing with a multiplicity of
interrelated and evolving issues in a highly transparent public process.
ECR processes focus on public issues and involve government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, citizens, scientists, and business interests.
The value of collaborative ECR processes to management of increasingly
“wicked” public problems that are unstructured, cross-cutting, and relent-
less is well recognized (Weber and Khademian, 2008).
Much has changed in the three decades since ECR emerged as an idea to
be tested and early theory was developed. Today, win-win has become part of
the common vernacular in American society, and collaboration is a frequent
topic in policy discussions. As Emerson and colleagues describe this:
Public and private stakeholders continue to turn to ECR and indeed
have extended this innovation over the past thirty years beyond its initial
application in the litigation context, to other applications upstream—
to the enforcement arena, to rule making, and to policy and site-spe-
cific plan development. Federal and state laws have been created,
including the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the Negoti-
ated Rulemaking Act, to clarify and broaden the use of ECR. Admin-
istrative programs have been established—among them, the Conflict
Prevention and Resolution Center at the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Collaborative Action and Dispute Resolution Center
at the U.S. Department of Interior, and the U.S. Institute for Environ-
mental Conflict Resolution at the Morris K. Udall Foundation—to
build infrastructure and garner resources to support more ECR.
Indeed, the underlying principles of the field are now being drawn on
by some federal agencies to overhaul internal management practices
and reform individual and programmatic performance measures
[Emerson, O’Leary, and Bingham, 2004, p. 221].
ECR has expanded from largely ad hoc application in site- or issue-
specific situations to now being embedded in agency programs and procedures.
With this dramatically expanded landscape of ECR activity, it is now
worth revisiting some of the field’s initial prescriptions, which were pro-
posed at a time when the eventual reach and character of ECR could only
be imagined. As Emerson and colleagues (2004) observe, “One of the most
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difficult challenges for ECR research is the heterogeneity of the ECR
processes themselves as well as the diversity of applications and intended
effects” (p. 222). In fact, Dukes (2004) posed the question about differ-
ences between “programmatic processes and those that develop organi-
cally” and discovered that “this element has barely been examined” 
(p. 210). Today there exist variations on the initial ECR model, with man-
dated or compulsory mediation among them. The genesis of individual
ECR processes, in particular whether they are voluntary, is not inconse-
quential to their dynamics. Though little examined, such distinctions have
both theoretical and practical implications.
Why Mandate ECR?
Management of many environmental and natural resource issues—particu-
larly those at the scale of ecosystems—requires collaboration across multiple
stakeholders and agencies because no single party possesses the knowledge,
authority, resources, and capabilities to manage such issues alone (Agranoff,
2007; Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005; Weber and Khademian, 2008; Wondolleck
and Yaffee, 2000). However, this imperative for collaboration is not always
matched by a parallel interest in collaboration by those who are party to the
conflict. Many of these issues reside in a political and organizational context
that can resist collaboration. Whether it is agencies protecting turf and
maintaining control (Bardach, 1998) or parties firmly rooted in an adversar-
ial mind-set (Golann, 1989), situations exist where parties are not inclined
to engage even if by all objective measures their interests would be better
served by so doing (Katz, 1993; SPIDR, 1991). Sometimes those agency
managers who are best positioned to initiate or support a process are resis-
tant. Nabatchi (2007) details a long list of reasons public managers may
readily dismiss collaboration, among them
inertia, fear of losing control and incurring oversight, and lack of knowl-
edge, resources, high-level support, and incentives . . . pervasive litigation
mentality, fear of looking weak, the perception that ADR is a passing fad,
lack of experience, negative experiences, perverse incentives, lack of set-
tlement authority, and concerns about confidentiality [p. 647].
For collaboration to occur in such situations, ECR needs to be nudged,
or even required. Sometimes reluctant or skeptical parties must be com-
pelled to give a process a chance.
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Voluntary participation, for good reason, is a central tenet embedded
in theories of collaboration and dispute resolution, but not all ECR
processes are voluntary. There are no fewer than four mandated collabora-
tive processes for the USDA Forest Service alone (Cheng, 2006). The
Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000
mandates that the Forest Service collaborate with local communities in
resource advisory councils “whether they want to or not, or know how to
or not” (Leahy, 2006, pp. 5–6). The Clean Air Act statutorily mandates the
U.S. EPA to resolve selected disputes involving tribes and the states through
collaborative negotiation processes (Van de Wetering and McKinney,
2006). NOAA and other federal agencies have been mandated by executive
order to collaborate in restoration of the Great Lakes (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2007). Several other large-scale collaborative ecosystem
restoration initiatives, including those concerned with the Everglades and
the San Francisco Bay Delta (Lurie, 2004), were triggered by mandates.
McGuire (2006) references the increasing prevalence of other collaborative
management arrangements “prescribed by law.” Some collaborative processes
are de facto mandated when there are no alternative tools available to
accomplish required goals. These directives and mandates extend the reach
of ECR, but they nonetheless violate the fundamental principle that ECR
processes be voluntary.
Voluntary: A Central Tenet of ECR
The theoretical premise and standard prescription that environmental con-
flict resolution processes be voluntary has been in place since the beginning
of this field. At the risk of tedium but with the objective of demonstrating
both how pervasive and enduring this tenet is, this section offers multiple
excerpts from the literature on collaboration, dispute resolution, and more
recently public administration.
The early pioneers of the ECR field explored the potential of multi-
party negotiations in resolution of public disputes and framed a set of def-
initions and process prescriptions that have stood the test of time. Bacow
and Wheeler (1984, p. 26) emphasized that “negotiation is a consensual
process from beginning to end. Any party can elect not to participate.”
“The voluntary nature of negotiations should be stressed,” noted Susskind
and Cruikshank (1987, p. 96). “Consensus building,” they wrote, “requires
informal, face-to-face interaction among specially chosen representatives
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of all ‘stakeholding’ groups; a voluntary effort to seek ‘all-gain’ rather than
‘win-lose’ solutions or watered-down political compromise” (p. 11).
Cormick (1980) framed perhaps the first working definition, one that
remains a standard in the field today: “Mediation is a voluntary process in
which those involved in a dispute jointly explore and reconcile their dif-
ferences.” As Moore (1996, p. 19) put it, “Voluntary refers to freely cho-
sen participation and freely made agreement. Parties are not forced to
negotiate, mediate or settle by either an internal or external party to a dispute.”
Examining the first decade of experience with ECR processes, Bingham (1986)
offered this definition: “The term ‘environmental dispute resolution’ refers col-
lectively to a variety of approaches that allow the parties to meet face to face
to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or poten-
tially controversial situation. Although there are differences among the
approaches, all are voluntary processes” (1986, p. xv).
More recent analyses of collaborative processes involving environmen-
tal issues have reconfirmed this long-standing tenet. O’Leary and Bingham
(2003, p. 6) write, “Despite the variance in ECR techniques and processes,
researchers have identified five characteristics shared by all forms of ECR
(with the exception of binding arbitration),” the first of which is that “par-
ticipation is usually voluntary for all participants.” Wondolleck and Yaffee
(2000, p. xiii) concur that “such multiparty relationships are voluntary,
involve face-to-face interaction and interdependence, and seek specific
goals.” Daniels and Walker (2001, p. 57) emphasize that “whether collab-
orative behaviors emerge depends first and foremost on the participants,
and there is no practical way or ethical reason to force them to interact col-
laboratively. Collaboration cannot be forced, scheduled, or required; it
must be nurtured, permitted, and promoted.”
The growing literature on collaborative public management also iden-
tifies voluntary engagement as a key characteristic. Thomson and Perry
(2006, p. 25) note that “the implementation of collaboration is complex,
not only because participation is voluntary. . . . The potential to withdraw
from the relationship may be particularly high if collaborations are unable
to achieve short-term success.” Bingham and O’Leary (2006, p. 162) add
that an important prerequisite is “willingness to collaborate.” The prescrip-
tion that dispute resolution processes be voluntary was implicit in the Soci-
ety of Professionals in Dispute Resolution’s (SPIDR’s) recommendations
for agency sponsorship of collaborative processes. They noted that “in order for
an agreement-seeking process to be credible and legitimate, representatives
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of all necessary parties—those involved with or affected by the potential
outcomes of the process—should agree to participate, or at least not object
to the process going forward” (SPIDR, 1997, p. 9). Huxham (1996) con-
cludes that because “collaboration is voluntary, partners generally need to
justify their involvement in it in terms of its contribution to their own aims
or refrain from collaborating altogether” (quoted in Thomson and Perry,
2006, p. 26).
In short, it is a long-standing and broadly accepted assumption that a
fundamental characteristic of effective ECR processes is that these processes
are voluntary; parties can choose whether to participate and whether to
remain engaged in a process once under way. This tenet found its way into
policy prescription when the directors of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued a
joint Memorandum on Environmental Conflict Resolution in November
2005, directing federal agencies “to increase the effective use of environ-
mental conflict resolution and build institutional capacity for collaborative
problem-solving” (Bolton and Connaughton, 2005, p. 5). The memo
summarizes twenty-five years of scholarship and professional practice in a
set of eight core principles, one of which is to “ensure balanced, voluntary
inclusion of affected/concerned interests; all parties should be willing and
able to participate and select their own representative.”
Why Voluntariness Matters
Although the prescription that collaborative processes be voluntary is well
established in the literature, there has been surprisingly little explicit explo-
ration of the reasons being voluntary is deemed essential. Nor has there
been discussion in the public dispute resolution literature of what might be
the implications if collaboration is mandated of participants instead. What
appear to be the underlying assumptions of this tenet? How does being vol-
untary matter to ECR? If we understand the basis for the voluntary pre-
scription, what cautions should accompany a mandated process?
It is difficult to find an explicit explanation in the literature of the rea-
sons voluntary is presumed necessary, but its importance is implicit in
many discussions. In particular, two factors stand out. One centers on the
dimension of choice implied by a process that is voluntary. The second fac-
tor revolves around the concept of procedural justice and its implications
for the perceived fairness of a process.
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Voluntary Implies Choice
When a decision to engage in a collaborative process is made voluntarily, it
implies that the parties have, on their own volition, chosen to become
involved. As Emerson, O’Leary, and Bingham note, “If we step back and
look at the system as a whole, we can ask whether the system is function-
ing better on some dimension after it affords people the choice to use all
the various tools appropriately, including ECR, to optimize environmental
policy and its applications” (2004, p. 230). Bacow and Wheeler emphasize
the importance of this choice:
We are broadly concerned here with incentives to negotiate, but we
must recognize that the decision to enter negotiations is quite different
from the decision to come to agreement. A person may be willing to
explore the possibility of settlement without committing himself or
herself to a consensual resolution. Likewise, the decision not to initiate
negotiation may be different from the decision not to accept someone
else’s invitation to meet, just as the decision to withdraw from negotia-
tions once they have begun is somewhat different from the decision not
to talk in the first place. All such choices require a careful weighing of
the consequences. As the consequences are likely to differ, so is the
nature of the choices [1984, p. 43].
Hence choice implies consideration of alternatives and weighing of
consequences; it implies an explicit assessment of the potentials and short-
comings of varying alternatives. The implication is that, lacking choice,
this careful weighing does not occur; parties will be less likely to have will-
ingly and thoughtfully considered their interests and options and the
potential of a collaborative negotiation process to satisfy those interests.
The purpose of the convening stage of an ECR process is to facilitate
informed choices by educating stakeholders “about the nature of the
process” and determining “whether or not the stakeholders are willing to
participate or if they have better alternatives” (Carlson, 1999, p. 174). 
A deliberate decision to collaborate suggests that a party understands the
collaborative process and its purpose as well as their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991) should the
collaborative process fail, and the party has determined that collaboration
will likely better serve their interests. This understanding and perspective
matters to a process. As Daniels and Walker (2001, p. 59) explain, it cre-
ates “an atmosphere of open communication and collaboration, where
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shared self-interest is the motivation, in a committed search for a mutually
beneficial outcome through joint decision making.” Choice instills com-
mitment to good faith participation and serious effort to try to achieve the
potential in a process. Thomson and Perry (2006, p. 28) suggest that “pub-
lic managers, if they enter collaborations with their eyes open, will be more
likely to appreciate, reflect on, and support the relationships that are so
critical to collaborative efforts.” They conclude with the warning: “Don’t
collaborate unless you are willing to thoughtfully consider and educate yourself
about the nature of the process involved ” (p. 29, emphasis in original). 
A mandate, however, can derail this thoughtful consideration and self-
education and in so doing undercut a party’s perceptions of the value of the
process and their incentives to engage in good faith.
Voluntary Implies Fairness
Choice in our society is also perceived as fair; individuals are not being
forced to do something against their will. “Highly visible compulsory
processes,” Katz (1993, p. 53) notes, “are bound to make some litigants
question whether they are being treated fairly.” SPIDR guidelines empha-
size that “a fair mediation program allows disputants to make informed
and voluntary decisions about whether and on what terms to resolve their
dispute” (1998, p. 5). If a process is perceived to be fair, parties engage in
it with confidence that they will be treated fairly; their interests will be
heard and acted on (Lande, 2004; Smith and McDonough, 2001). They
are not going to be coerced or co-opted into agreements that are not in
their best interests (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991; Goldberg, Green, and
Sander, 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). As O’Leary and Bingham
(2003, p. 8) explain:
Procedural justice, a commonly used framework in ADR research, sug-
gests that participants’ satisfaction with an ADR process is a function
of their opportunities to control and participate in the process, present
views, and receive fair treatment. When participants sense that they
have received procedural justice, the perceived legitimacy of the deci-
sions and outcomes increases, which reduces the likelihood that partic-
ipants will challenge them in the future. 
Bean, Fisher, and Eng (2007, p. 451) emphasize that ECR processes
“must meet basic ethical guidelines; for example, that the parties own the
process [and] that parties have self-determination.” Voluntary engagement
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bestows a sense of fairness and consequently legitimacy, instilling a level of
respect for the potential of the process and contributing to a participant’s
commitment to the process and good faith involvement in it.
Procedural justice also has value beyond the process itself, extending an
aura of credibility and legitimacy that is important to ECR processes,
which by definition reside in the public realm. A sense of procedural jus-
tice conveys to those outside the process that it is appropriate and worth-
while because those involved deemed it worth trying and did so willingly.
Dukes and Firehock’s guide (2001) for environmental advocates under-
scores the necessity of a fair and transparent ECR process because of the
level of vigilant oversight on the part of some individuals and organizations
that are wary about collaboration.
Shortcomings of Mandates: Perspectives from 
Court-Annexed ADR
If these essential qualities of understanding, commitment, good faith, col-
laborative mind-set, fairness, and legitimacy are bestowed on a process by
virtue of the voluntary nature of the parties’ engagement in it, how might
their absence have an impact on the dynamics of a mandated process?
There has been little explicit attention to the consequences of mandated
ECR processes (Good, 2007; Leahy, 2006; Lurie, 2004; Stephenson,
1995). Bingham (1986) was one of the first, along with Gray (1985),
Brock (1991), and Brock and Cormick (1989), to express caution about
the potential need for and implications of mandated processes in public
disputes: “It is not yet known with any certainty whether environmental
dispute resolution processes should always be voluntary or whether cir-
cumstances exist when they should be required” (p. 53). Bingham was con-
cerned that “accomplishing the intended goals without losing the flexibility
that is the basic strength of voluntary dispute resolution processes will be a
challenge” (1986, p. 149).
Though lacking in the ECR context, examination of the concerns asso-
ciated with mandated or compulsory ADR processes in the legal context,
and involving small claims or general civil as opposed to environmental or
other public disputes, is extensive (see, for example, Golann, 1989;
Hedeen, 2005; Katz, 1993; Kirmayer and Wessel, 2004; Lande, 2004; Munro,
1999; Nelle, 1992; Smith, 1998; SPIDR, 1991; Winston, 1996; Wissler,
2002). As Hedeen commented:
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While early mediation programs relied on voluntary participation,
many courts now require litigants to try mediation before proceeding
to court. Even in mandatory mediation, self-determination is essential:
disputants are free to leave the process at any point, with or without set-
tlement, and without coercion. While voluntary mediation may be
highlighted in policy and theory, it is not always realized in practice
[2005, p. 273].
Katz (1993, p. 2) defines compulsory ADR as “any process in which
the parties experience a lack of free choice about their participation.”
Golann (1989, p. 491) identifies the many reasons mandates may be war-
ranted because parties may not otherwise voluntarily choose ADR, such as
lack of awareness of the option, misunderstanding about the process, pref-
erence for sustained adversarial exchange, perception of a tactical advan-
tage to continued litigation, being discouraged by their attorneys, and
perception that litigation is a superior path to follow. Golann’s focus is on
civil cases in the courts, but these same types of consideration challenge
parties’ choices to enter ECR processes and how they behave once engaged
(Nabatchi, 2007; O’Leary and Raines, 2001).
Cohen (1991) compares mandated processes in the court context with
what he refers to as “pure” or “traditional” mediation, that is, mediation as
an option that “parties may choose . . . as an alternative to beginning the
litigation process” (p. 36). He argues that mandated processes represent a
different model of ADR, one that should be acknowledged and its
processes “fine-tuned . . . to more precisely fit the needs of those whom it
serves” (p. 45). Cohen notes that “settlement rates are lowest when the par-
ties are unenthusiastic about mediation or do not trust the mediator,” and
“low motivation to resolve the conflict is associated with low probability of
settlement” (p. 43). Wissler (2002) has found mixed evidence of the asso-
ciation between mandates and the likelihood of settlement, with some
studies suggesting a lower settlement rate while other studies indicate no
correlation.
There is an important distinction made in the legal literature between
coercion to enter an ADR process and coercion to reach an agreement within
that process (Hedeen, 2005; Cohen, 1991; Golann, 1989; Goldberg, Green,
and Sander, 1986; Sander, 2000). In theory, a party can always exit a
process if they feel their interests are not being met or they are being disad-
vantaged in some way. Party self-determination and the role of the media-
tor in ensuring this self-determination is deemed paramount (Hedeen,
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2005; Lande, 2004). Consequently, some have suggested that mandatory
mediation is a contradiction in terms or, as Sander (2000, p. 7) put it, an
“oxymoron . . . mediation means voluntarily agreeing to a result. How can
you force someone to voluntarily agree to a result?” Regardless of this logic,
there is nonetheless evidence that such coercion does occur (Hedeen,
2005; Wissler, 2002). As Hedeen (p. 286) notes, there is “a gulf between
what is promised and what is practiced”; mediator pressure to boost the
settlement rate has been observed. Coercion can also be felt in ECR
processes because they reside in a highly public and political context that
inevitably influences party behavior. For example, in the CALFED San
Francisco Bay Delta collaborative ecosystem restoration process, high-level
officials invoked what was referred to as the “dead cat” scenario: a balky
agency partner was asked if his or her organization wanted to be the one
with the “dead cat” at its doorstep if its recalcitrance led to deadlock and
subsequent collapse of the process (Lurie, 2004). As Ingram and Fraser
(2006, p. 108) observed about this process, “The water issue was of such
high visibility for so long that no one wanted the blame for derailing agree-
ment.” These pressures kept parties engaged, and they compelled—some
might say coerced—agreement on some issues.
The collected judgment is clearly that voluntary engagement is pre-
ferred, but most legal analysts accept that compulsory participation is at
times necessary in court-connected ADR. Experience has shown that such
processes can indeed yield mutually acceptable settlements at considerable
time savings to parties and the courts. Just as the promise of ECR has
encouraged broader application (Emerson, O’Leary, and Bingham, 2004),
this “new understanding of how such processes work” (Katz, 1993, p. 21)
has compelled most courts to “enthusiastically enforce statutes, rules, and
even agreements for consensual ADR” notwithstanding attorneys being
opposed. Both anecdotal evidence (Katz, 1993) and systematic analyses
(Golann, 1989; Talcott, 1989; Wissler, 2002) suggest that parties, in hind-
sight, are satisfied with ADR despite their initial reluctance to participate.
Katz (1993) quotes one federal judge who offered a not uncommon obser-
vation: “I do know that but for my making summary jury trials mandatory
in these cases, they would not have occurred. I know also that the attorney
who objected to the first summary jury trial he was required to participate
in is now the biggest local fan of the procedure” (fn. 158).
Katz (1993, p. 21) warns, however, that “consensual ADR depends on
cooperation,” and parties forced to collaborate may do so uncooperatively,
making the effort fruitless: “Many of the problems evidenced by ADR 
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litigation would be removed if all participation were voluntary . . . the
more troubling questions of good faith and meaningful participation
would appear irrelevant if parties could simply refuse to take part in the
procedure in question” (Katz, 1993, p. 53). She concludes:
On balance, then, the argument for voluntariness appears strong. First,
there is little evidence that compulsion produces greater efficiency or
greater justice. Second, there is at least some evidence that some partic-
ipants feel undue pressure and believe their right to a fair trial is vio-
lated by compulsory procedures. Third, voluntary procedures would
eliminate a great deal of potential litigation over issues of compulsion,
and particularly over the troublesome question of the duty to partici-
pate in good faith. Fourth, voluntariness is consistent with the underlying
philosophy of ADR [Katz, 1993, p. 54; emphasis added].
Peltz (1999) similarly argues that “mediation is the process most unlike
adjudication, and arguably its integrity is preserved only if participation is
voluntary” (p. 1; emphasis added).
In sum, voluntariness is perceived to be an essential dimension of
ADR, embedded in the field’s core philosophy and a factor that preserves
the integrity of collaborative processes. The benefits of voluntary engage-
ment to the functioning of these processes are clear and the shortcomings
favor good caution. Nevertheless, like many mediated civil cases, not all
ECR processes are voluntary, and this reality begs attention parallel to that
given to court-connected ADR. When and how might the impact of non-
voluntary engagement be felt in public dispute resolution processes? More-
over, what challenges should interveners be attentive to when parties may
be unwilling participants in a public environmental dispute resolution
process?
Degrees of Choice and Their Implications
Choice is not a binary concept. Rather, there are degrees of choice and
hence degrees to which participation in a collaborative process is voluntary.
As Hedeen (2005, p. 273) put it, “All mediations are voluntary, but some
are more voluntary than others.” Figure 1 depicts a continuum of volun-
tary engagement in public dispute resolution processes, with parties will-
ingly engaged at one end and required to participate at the other end. Its
purpose is to identify nuances in participant choices and predispositions
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about an ECR process in order to identify where variations in process
dynamics are likely that will have bearing on intervention strategies. The
core characteristics of processes along this continuum are aligned; they are
all representative of the key parties with a stake or role in resolving a par-
ticular dispute or problem. The processes are intended to promote problem
solving or dispute resolution by encouraging communication, understand-
ing, and collaboration, and they are consensus-seeking. However, move-
ment along the continuum from left to right increasingly violates the core
principle that ECR processes be voluntary.
As the position of a process along this continuum moves from a high
degree of voluntariness to a low degree, the starting dynamic will likely
vary, and these variations have significant implications for process manage-
ment. An intervener enters a very different process when the participants
are willingly engaged than when they are present under duress. Consider,
for example, the four positions spotlighted on the continuum.
Willing Choice
Willing engagement in a collaborative process is the product of the individ-
ual participant’s consideration and choice. Cohen (1991) refers to this as a
“pure” choice because the decision to engage is made wholly by the individ-
ual participant. A party presented with the collaborative option has the
opportunity to consider and decide by his or her own free will whether or not
to participate. The implication of a choice made willingly is that the parties
understand their interests and objectives as well as the process and its pur-
pose, and the parties will be committed to a good faith effort to the process.
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Willing choice Begrudged choice Someone else’s choice No choice
Entering attitude:
Good faith/commitment Ambivalence/reserved judgment
Uncertainty/wariness Resistance/skepticism
Begrudged Choice
Sometimes parties enter a process begrudgingly, not willingly. They are
responding to factors tangential to the dispute or problem. They might feel
obliged to participate because of pressure from other parties or the con-
vener (Hedeen and Coy, 2000; Nelson, 1990). Some agency bureaucrats
may prefer to just go it alone and render decisions within traditional
administrative procedures but might feel public or political pressure to col-
laborate. Sometimes factors that are unconnected to the process agenda, 
in particular “shadow issues” (Kolb and Williams, 2003), compel a party’s
participation but distract the party from the key issues on the table. If par-
ties make a decision to participate begrudgingly, they are more likely to
enter a process with some level of ambivalence, reserving judgment about
its potential and the value of their participation in it, and perhaps entering
with concerns and objectives other than those central to the process.
Someone Else’s Choice
Not infrequently, it is someone else’s decision that brings an individual par-
ticipant to the table. In these cases it is usually a superior’s assessment that
collaboration makes sense for an organization, whether for strategic or sub-
stantive reasons. When a participant is acting on someone else’s decision,
he or she as an individual has not benefited from assessing the process and
its potential and deciding for himself or herself that it is a preferred path
and should be pursued. The person is more likely to enter the process
uncertain about its scope, purpose, and functioning, and with some wari-
ness about his or her role in it.
No Choice
At the far end of the continuum are case situations in which the parties
essentially have no choice; a mandate has directed them to the table. 
In effect, participants in mandated processes have received a summons
(Hedeen and Coy, 2000), not an invitation to be thoughtfully considered.
Parties compelled by mandate to engage in processes located at this far end
of the continuum will often be resistant to the idea and skeptical about its
value (Lurie, 2004). They are more likely to enter with their adversarial
frame intact and without acknowledgment of, or respect for, the perspec-
tives of the other parties (Daniels and Walker, 2001).
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A Crack in the Foundation?
Compulsory participation, whatever its source, can challenge the very
essence of what makes collaboration work by undermining key founda-
tional elements of ECR processes. Much has been written about
antecedents to collaboration and the essential elements of collaborative
ECR processes (see, for example, Cormick, 1980; Daniels and Walker,
2001; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991; Moore, 1996; Susskind, McKearnan,
and Thomas-Larmer, 1999; Thomson and Perry, 2006; U.S. Institute for
Environmental Conflict Resolution, 2006; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000;
Wood and Gray, 1991). A basic synthesis of this extensive literature sug-
gests that the foundation of effective ECR processes is constructed of issues
that are amenable to collaborative resolution, incentives for collaborative
engagement, process qualities that encourage cooperative behavior, and a
process structure that accommodates and effectively guides collaborative
interaction. Here is a simple summary of these critical building blocks,
indicating which are likely to be compromised when participants engage in
a process less than voluntarily. The issue characteristics that make a situation
amenable to collaborative resolution include a high level of interdepen-
dence between the parties, complexity that impedes the possibility of uni-
lateral resolution, absence of fundamental rights or values, and need for
sharing resources, information, or risk such that parties necessarily work
together. These issue characteristics are necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions for constructive collaboration.
Building Blocks of Environmental Conflict Resolution (Italicized
Elements May Be Strained or Lacking in a Mandated Process)
I. Issue characteristics: Are the issues amenable to collaborative resolution?
High levels of interdependence
Need for resource, information, or risk sharing
Issue complexity
Unilateral resolution by any party not possible
No fundamental rights or values involved
II. Parties’ incentives: Do the parties perceive incentives to collaborate?
Sense of urgency
Recognition of interdependence
Recognition of need to work with others
Alternative options not preferred
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III. Process qualities: Does the process dynamic embody qualities essen-




Perception of fairness and legitimacy
IV. Process structure: Is the process structured and managed to support







Even if issues are amenable, the parties must still perceive incentives to
collaborate before they will voluntarily join a process. The second building
block contains those elements that influence a party’s motivation to engage
in a collaborative process, in particular recognition of interdependence and
the need to work together, a sense of urgency to deal with the issues in dis-
pute, and a perception that collaboration is the preferred approach. The
third building block contains the process qualities that instill cooperative
behavior among participants, in particular commitment, good faith, and
perception of fairness and legitimacy, all of which embody a collaborative
mind-set and encourage respectful interaction. Finally, the fourth building
block concerns the process structures that support and guide interaction
toward constructive resolution, capitalizing on the collaborative potential
inherent in the issue characteristics, incentives, and behavioral qualities of
participants. These structural elements include appropriate representation,
clarity of purpose, informed deliberation, problem or issue focus, effective
communication, and efficient management.
As indicated by the italicized elements in the list, the degree to which
participation is voluntary can influence both perceived incentives and
essential process qualities, and in so doing this can weaken the foundation
supporting an ECR process. If parties do not recognize their interdepen-
dence and need to work together, perceive an urgency to resolve the issue(s)
in dispute, or acknowledge that collaboration is the preferred path for
addressing their interests, then they are less likely to enter the process with
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commitment and in good faith. They will be less likely to judge their
involvement as fair and more likely to resist (at least initially) constructive
engagement. It is important to note that this seeming crack in the theoret-
ical foundation has not undermined ECR practice. However, lack of
acknowledgment of its presence has diverted needed attention from exam-
ination of its implications for practice.
Conclusion
Voluntary engagement in ECR processes is the ideal. It ensures understand-
ing, commitment, and good-faith participation as well good reason for this
tenet to remain firmly in place. As Dukes and Firehock (2001, p. viii) note,
“Consensus processes can be powerful, but they are useful only to the extent
that participants fully understand and value the requirements of the
process.” Nevertheless, as discussed, not all situations are amenable to or
consistent with voluntary participation, and this reality challenges both the
principle and the process. As Daniels and Walker warn (2001, p. 64):
It is unrealistic to merely announce that a collaboration is beginning and
expect the current relationships and patterns of behavior to change.
Collaboration requires innovative decision-building structures designed
with considerable attention to the incentives that they create. If they do
not establish clear rewards for collaboration and disincentives for com-
petition, there is no reason to expect much change in behavior.” ECR
process design and management must account for these particular needs
when a process involves less-than-voluntary engagement.
ECR professionals have considerable experience intervening in processes
all along the continuum of voluntariness depicted in Figure 1.1 Their experi-
ence and insights should be more explicitly captured in order to enhance pro-
fessional practice as well as establish more accurate expectations among
policy makers, public managers, and potential participants in processes 
that may violate the voluntary prescription. Macfarlane and Mayer (2005)
discuss the troubling disconnect between collaboration theory and practice
and call for creating the “genuine marriage of rigorous theory and grounded
practice wisdom that can be taken seriously by academics and practitioners
alike” (p. 259). This brief examination of the voluntary tenet provides one
immediate example wherein this marriage might readily occur. By leaving
the voluntary tenet unexamined, the field inadvertently diverts attention
from important variations among ECR processes and deliberate develop-
ment of nuanced intervention strategies that acknowledge the particular
needs of mandated and other not-fully-voluntary processes. The fact that
ECR professionals have experience with processes across the continuum sug-
gests that there are ready lessons to be learned. Moreover, their experience
suggests that whether or not a process is voluntary may be less critical than
how it is managed, so as to instill those qualities associated with voluntary
engagement, that is, intervention strategies that ensure clarity in understand-
ing of the process, instill a desire to be involved, demonstrate collaborative
potential relative to alternatives, foster a sense of commitment and responsi-
bility, establish relationships that highlight interconnections and respectful
exchange, and embed standards of fairness.
Note
1. During presentation of this simple continuum at the Association for
Conflict Resolution-Environment and Public Policy section meeting in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in June 2006, several mediators in the audience
commented that a good portion of their projects fall toward the middle and
right side of the continuum, where the degree of voluntary engagement of
individual participants has been constrained. These practitioners sought
guidance from one another about the array of intervention challenges each had
encountered and strategies they had employed for managing processes that fall
at different points along the continuum.
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